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Abstract
In this paper we consider a simple economy where self interested tax
payers may have incentives to evade taxes and, to escape sanctions, to
bribing public o¢cials in charge for collection. We analyze the interactions
between evasion, corruption and monitoring as well as their adjustment
to a change in the institutional setting. At equilibrium we …nd that the
e¤ects of a tougher deterrence policy, increasing …nes, reduces evasion,
whereas its e¤ect on corruption is ambiguous.
The normative analysis for a utilitarian planner shows that a maximal
…ne principle holds, despite the fact that, in our setting, raising …nes
increases incentives to monitoring activities and their cost to society.
1 Introduction
It is widely agreed that tax evasion and corruption of public o¢cials are social
phenomena whose pervasive e¤ects can seriously hurt the economic growth and
the stability of social institutions (Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Shleifer and Vishny,
1993; Bardhan, 1997). Although an extensive literature has investigated their
origins, e¤ects, and size, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, the inter-
action between tax evasion and corruption has been only partially explored. In
general, the level of corruption and tax evasion in the economy mutually de-
pend on several structural and institutional features, such as the degree of risk
aversion, the wealth of taxpayers and the wage of public o¢cials, the overall tax
burden of the economy, and the organization and the e¢ciency of the enforcing
authorities.
In a normative perspective, the problem of the relationship between enforce-
ment, corruption, and deterrence has been recently analyzed, among others, by
Polinsky and Shavell (2001), who examine both the optimal amount of resources
tobe allocated to law enforcement and detection of bribery and the optimal …nes
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1structure. Since bribery agreements can dilute deterrence of the underlying vio-
lation, it is desirable for society to attempt to detect and penalize corruption in
order to preserve a given degree of deterrence. This result holds even if corrup-
tion is not completely deterred. An application of this …nding to the context of
tax evasion would imply that taxpayers have to be audited and auditors have
to be monitored since …ghting against corruption may be worthwhile in order
to foster deterrence of tax evasion. Moreover, Polinsky and Shavell also show
that both the optimal …ne for the underlying o¤ense and the optimal …ne for
bribery should be maximal, mainly because detecting any violation involves a
cost. These results extend the classical theory of enforcement to the case when
corruption may dilute deterrence for the underlying o¤ence.
A distinctive feature of this approach, as in the classical analysis of the de-
terrence problem, is the assumption that the Government can fully commit to a
monitoring probability, which leads to perfect substitutability between …nes and
probability of detection for a given level of deterrence. Other contributions (see
Moohkerjee and Png, 1995, as an example) also consider the e¤ect of corruption
on deterrence of the underlying o¤ence taking the probability of detection as
exogenous. In this case it is a fortiori true that raising …nes does not a¤ect
the probability of monitoring. However, committing to a given probability of
monitoring is not necessarily a feasible policy to a planner. In principle, ex-
post incentives to inspect illegal activities are not independent of the size of the
…nes. For a given crime level it is possible to argue that the incentives to pro-
vide monitoring activities are positively related to the magnitude of the …nes.
For example, a tax authority may have incentives to strengthen its inspection
activity when …nes for evasion are increased, since this could raise its revenue.
As another example, we could think of prosecutors’ incentives to investigate
corruption to be high when the …nes for corruption are high since this provides
better career perspectives.
In this paper we extend the standard tax evasion problem faced by a popula-
tion of identical taxpayers, who can be audited by self interested public o¢cials,
by introducing the possibility that the payment of a bribe arises in return for
tax evasion not being reported, once discovered. In particular, we analyse the
implications of the absence of commitment to inspecting corruption. When eva-
sion is discovered, the possibility of a bribing agreement may lead to corruption.
The incentives to enter the illegal agreement are a¤ected by the probability that
a …scal authority monitors its employees in order to collect …nes and to deter
evasion. The incentives to monitor corruption, in accordance with the idea that
committing monitoring is not feasible, are related to the amount of …nes that
can be collected as a result of the activity. Di¤erently from the hypotheses of
the classical theory of enforcement, according to which the probability of detect-
ing corruption (and the underlying o¤ence) and the …nes can be seen as perfect
substitute policies for a given level of deterrence, in our setting, for a given
level of deterrence for both evasion and corruption, the incentives to perform
monitoring activities are increasing in the level of …nes.1 More speci…cally, in
1Notice that our analysis is performed in a setting where reward schedules for corruption
2order to analyze the relationships between …nes and monitoring, we consider
an inspection game between self interested tax auditors and corruption moni-
torers within the framework of two di¤erent institutional settings which de…ne
the reward structure for monitorers. In the …rst, we model a Tax Authority
hierarchy where the incentives to monitoring are provided by collections of …nes
for evasion. In the second, we assume that the incentives to the inspectors (e.g.
prosecutors) are proportional to the …nes for corruption. These two alternative
speci…cations allow us to analyze in detail the e¤ects of raising …nes (among
other things) on both the underlying o¤ence and corruption.
The main results of the paper can be sinthesized as follows. Under both
institutional arrengements (i.e. the structure of the monitoring agency) an
increase of the …ne for evasion reduces tax evasion wheras its e¤ects on the
size of corruption are ambiguous. As for the …ne for bribe, its e¤ects are related
to the institutional setting; namely, under the hypothesis that the monitoring
agency collects …nes for corruption, an increase determines a reduction of the
expected bribe, thus reducing incentives to monitoring. The overall e¤ects turns
out to be a reduction of both corruption and tax evasion. Under the hypothesis
that the monitoring agency collects …nes for evasion, an increase of the …ne for
bribe reduces the level of corruption while its e¤ects on tax evasion depend on
the level of the …ne.
The …nal issue analized in this paper is normative. Given the setting of
the model and by considering a utilitarian government we ask the following
questions:
1. What is the e¤ect of the costly enforcement structure on the optimal level
of the tax rate compared to the …rst best outcome?
2. What is the optimal composition of the public budget between enforce-
ment expenditures and public good provision?
3. Given the absence of commitment in the inspection game does a maximal
…ne principle hold?
2 Setting
We consider a simple economy composed of N identical agents ( N is normalized
to 1). The preferences of each agent are described by the utility function U =
M + V(G), where M is the level of income and G the amount of public good
In order to get resources for the provision of the public good G, tax revenues
have to be collected. Given that the tax base is veri…able only at a postive cost
for society, self interested agents have incentives to under report the tax base
unless a large enough punishment for misbehavior is credibly anticipated. In
inspectors are exogenously …xed. A more general analysis would allow for the possibility for
the planner to optimally choose the wage schedule for the enforcers. This would, however,
indirectly reintroduce the possibility of committing monitoring probabilities, which is not the
focus of this paper.
3order to deter evasion society assigns to a public enforcement agency, composed
by a subset of the total population n1, the right to audit tax payers and, in
case evidence for evasion is found, the right to report misbehavior to the Tax
Authority. The right to collect evidence for misbehavior and apply …nes does
not prevent agents in the enforcement structure (tax auditors or public o¢cials)
to concede on the temptation to collect private gains from their activity in the
form of bribes, denoted by b. This opportunity dilutes deterrence of tax evasion
and, in order to keep incentives for the taxpayers to report their income large
enough, we consider the possibility that resources can be devoted to controlling
bribery agreements by another fraction of (uncorruptible) monitorers, n2.
This basic institutional framework is consistent with the idea that the en-
forcement structure is organized through a legalsystem: the legislature sets …nes
for misbehavior, crimes have to be proved at a cost and responsibility for en-
forcement falls on an agency whose actual behavior cannot be precommitted at
the legislative stage. This simple society has to decide the amount of public good
to be provided given the constraints set by imperfect enforcement. Morevoer,
an institutional setting specifying controls and remuneration of public o¢cials
has to be arranged.
To analyze the basic features of this problem we set up a speci…c model
whose timeline structure is as follows:
Stage 1. Income tax rate ¿, …nes for evasion ©e; and …nes for corruption
©Â are set, the number of public o¢cials n1 having the right to monitor …scal
reports is hired, an agency, composed of n2 individuals in charge of controlling
public o¢cials, is established.
Stage 2. Given the institutional setting above, n0 risk neutral taxpayers
decide the fraction ® of the tax base M to be reported.
Stage 3. n1 tax audits are delivered. With probability p(®) the exact amount
of tax evasion is discovered and veri…ed by each tax auditor.
Stage 4. Among the subset of veri…ed tax evasion acts, p(®)n1, the possibility
of a bribe arises. The surplus to the parties is de…ned by the …ne for evasion and
the …ne for corruption tobe paid in the event the bribery agreement is discovered
and is divided according to the Nash bargaining solution. Simultaneously the
monitoring agency sets the level of internal monitoring to be delivered, taking
into account its bene…ts (…nes collected) and its costs. Monitoring occurs, part
of the bribery agreements are discovered, punishment is implemented, the public
good is produced and consumed.
The distinguishing features of the model outlined above are that the rates
of corruption and monitoring are endogenously determined, given the level of
tax evasion, to capture the idea that no commitment to enforcement levels is
assumed in the analysis. The aim will be the characterization of the decision
of atomistic taxpayers, given the enforcement structure outlined above, and the
corresponding level of monitoring and corruption emerging in the equilibrium
of the game. Finally, at the normative stage optimal …nes and tax rates will be
de…ned.
43 Tax evasion with bribery
The seminal paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) provides the standard
framework for the economic analysis of tax evasion. Given the enforcement
structure and the tax system of an economy and assuming that the true tax base
of any taxpayer is costly observable by the Tax Authority, rational taxpayers are
faced with the decision of whether to reduce tax payments by under-reporting
their income level. The private cost of exploiting this opportunity is related
to both the probability that under-reporting will be detected and, in case of
detection, to a monetary penalty. Thus, the decision of whether, and how
much, to evade resembles the choice of whether, and how much, to gamble; it
follows that under certain circumstances the taxpayer may decide to report a
taxable income below its true value. This basic version of the model has been
extended along a number of directions. Among these the most relevant for the
purpose of this paper is the one which suggests that the tax evasion decision
may be in‡uenced by the probability of corruption of public o¢cials. In our
case, we consider the behavior of risk neutral individuals facing the probability
of evasion being documented, once an audit takes place, positively related to
the amount of evasion. This feature of the veri…cation technology characterizes
most tax systems and has been already introduced in the literature (Slemrod and
Yitzhaki, 2000). For example, Yitzhaki (1987) assumes that the probability of
proving the illicit act is an increasing function of evaded income.2 Therefore the
increase in expected income due to an increase in evasion, for a given probability
of veri…cation, is o¤set by the increase in the probability of veri…cation, this
latter limiting the extent of evasion and yielding an interior solution for ®, the
fraction of tax base reported.
As for the institutional arrangement we assume that the amount of monitor-
ing to be performed in society is positively related to the expected …nes that can
be collected. For any given level of compensation w to be paid to the enforcers
(tax auditors and their monitorers), an agency will monitor corruption to the
extent that the expected …nes collected cover the cost of monitoring, z . For any
given level of expected monitoring, m, the public o¢cial who managed to prove
evasion has to decide whether or not entering a bribing agreement and, in the
a¤ermative, the surplus from the agreement is split according to the Nash bar-
gaining solution. Notice that the level of bribes, corruption and monitoring is
set simultaneously, for any given level of tax auditing. Simultaneity is a natural
implication of the following assumptions: a. the bribing coalition is atomistic
with respect to the economy and takes the probability of monitoring as given at
the aggregate level, b. the bribing coalition is secret by de…nition and, hence,
the decision to monitor tax auditors is taken without observing the (aggregate)
level of bribes.
2”The assumption that the probability of being caught is independent of the amount of
income evaded seems very unrealistic. Usually, the tax authorities have some idea of the
taxpayer’s true income, and it seems reasonable to assume that the probablity of being caught
is an increasingfunction of the undeclared income (or of theratioof undeclared totrue income,
as in Srinivasan, 1973).” S. Yitzhaki, 1987, p.127.
5It is worth to stress that in our setting we assumed that the compensation
to enforcers, w, is exogenous for the …scal authority and that committing mon-
itoring is not feasible. These two assumptions de…ne the problem above as an
inspection game where the public o¢cials who found evidence of evasion have
to decide whether to enter the bribing agreement or not and the monitoring
agency has to decide whether to monitor the auditors or not, given the …nes
they expect to gain. As already suggested above, we consider two cases: one
in which the expected gain to the monitorers is given by the …nes for evasion
collected from monitored bribing coalitions and one in which we assign them the
…nes for corruption. The interpretation may change according to the institution
involved in the monitoring. In the …rst case we may think of a Tax Authority
which pursues monitoring in order to raise …nes for evasion while in the other
we may think of a prosecutor whose bene…ts are linked to the enforcement of
anti corruption legislation.
The model can be summarized as follows: the economy is composed of three
types of agents, a monitoring agency (composed of n2 monitorers), a population
of public o¢cials (tax auditors, n1), and a population of taxpayers (1¡n1¡n2).
Taxpayers are measure zero with respect to the size of the economy and choose
the fraction of their taxable income, ®, to be reported to the tax authority.
In doing so they take into account that, according to the auditing technology,
they will be monitored with a given probability a = n1
1¡n1¡n2, and evasion will
be discovered with probability p(®) which is decreasing in the share of reported
income. If a taxpayer evades and the evasion is discovered, she will be subjected
to a monetary …ne, ©e. At the same time the taxpayer expects that, with a
given probability, Â, a bribing agreement will be settled. In the latter case,
the taxpayer would pay a bribe, b, to the tax collector instead of the …ne ©e.
By exploiting the opportunity of a bribery agreement, however, the taxpayer is
aware that if the illegal transaction will be detected by the monitoring agency,
which can happen with a probability m, she will incur into an additional penalty
©Â, over and above the penalty for evasion.
3.1 The bribery agreement
Let M be the level of income earned by a taxpayer and ¿ be the income tax
rate in the economy. If the taxpayer reported a fraction ® of her income, with
0 · ® · 1, the net disposable income will be M¡¿®M. Assume that a taxpayer
reports less than her true income, is subject to an audit with probability a
and evasion is discovered with probability p(®). If the evasion is reported, the
taxpayer will have to pay a …ne ©e, which we assume to be proportional to the
tax evasion, that is ©e = Áe [¿ (1 ¡ ®) M] where the parameter Áe (Áe > 1)
measures the …ne rate for evasion.3 In this state of the world the taxpayer may
be willing to pay a bribe, b, to the auditor in return for her evasion not being
reported. In order to de…ne the surplus to be split in the bribing coalition,
we examine under which conditions both the tax auditor and the taxpayer are
3In this case, the tax payer’s disposable income will be M ¡¿®M ¡Áe[¿ (M ¡ ®M)].
6willing to enter the bribery agreement.
If the evader pays b, she faces a probability m that the auditor will be
monitored by the tax authority and the bribe detected. In this case the bribe
transaction will be undone and the taxpayer will have to pay both the …ne
for evasion, Áe [¿ (M ¡ ®M)], and a …ne for bribery which we assume to be





m + b(1 ¡ m).5 It follows that once audited
and detected as an evader, the taxpayer will be willing to pay a bribe rather
than comply to the …ne for evasion if and only if
£
ÁÂb + Áe¿(1 ¡ ®)M
¤




1 ¡ m + ÁÂm
Áe[¿(M ¡ ®M)]:
Consider now the incentives to take a bribe faced by an auditor. We assume
that if she takes a bribe and the bribery agreement will be detected, the bribing
agreement is undone and she will have to pay a …ne. For simplicity, this …ne is
set at the same level as for the taxpayer. Hence, the auditor will accept a bribe
if and only if
b(1 ¡ m) > ÁÂbm
or, equivalently,




Thus, a bribery agreement can be implemented for any bribe b such that
0 < b <
(1¡ m)
1¡ (1¡ ÁÂ)m
[Áe¿(1 ¡ ®)M]: (2)
We assume that when the conditions above are satis…ed, the bribery agree-
ment is implemented and the outcome b¤ will be determined as the solution of
a Nash bargaining problem. In particular, by denoting with ´ the bargaining
power of the evader and with 1 ¡ ´ the bargaining power of the public o¢cial,
it follows that 6
4The assumption that the bribe transaction is undone when discovered is similar to that
in Polinsky and Shavell (2001).
5It follows that the disposable income of the evader would be either M ¡¿®M ¡ b, if the
public o¢cial will not be monitored, or M ¡¿®M ¡Áe¿(1¡®)M ¡ÁÂb, if the public o¢cial
will be monitored.
6In the worst state of the world, that is after having paid both the …ne for evasion and the
…ne for bribery, the taxpayer’s disposable income will be M¡¿®M¡Áe¿(1¡®)M ¡ÁÂb¤. By
recognizing the inability of individuals to pay extreme …nes and that in general individuals are
rarely …ned an amount approximating their wealth, it seems appropriate to assume at least
M ¡¿®M ¡Áe¿(1¡ ®)M ¡ÁÂb¤ ¸ 0. The latter implies a constraint on the …nes structure
designed by the tax authority to be credible.
7b
¤ = (1¡ ´)
(1¡ m)
1¡ (1¡ ÁÂ)m
[Áe¿(1 ¡ ®)M] (3)
Notice that the bribe is increasing in the …ne for evasion, at a rate less than
one, as well as of course in the bargaining power of the public o¢cial. At the
same time, the bribe is decreasing in the monitoring probability, a feature that
will be crucial to characterize the equilibrium solution of the model.
3.2 The tax evasion decision
We turn now to the taxpayer’s income reporting decision. If the taxpayer
reported a fraction of her taxable income, the auditor veri…ed the illicit act
and the bribery agreement is implemented, taxpayer’s income is de…ned by
M ¡ ¿®M ¡
£
(1 ¡ m + ÁÂm)b¤ + mÁe¿(1¡ ®)M
¤
. By substituting b¤ we get
M ¡ ¿®M ¡ [(1 ¡ ´)(1 ¡ m) + m]Áe¿(1 ¡ ®)M.
We can de…ne now the expected income faced by the tax payer after an audit
has taken place and evasion has been veri…ed as ¦b, given by
¦b ´ M ¡ ¿®M ¡ [Áe¿(1 ¡ ®)M](1 ¡ Â)
¡ f[(1 ¡ ´)(1¡ m) + m]Áe¿(1 ¡ ®)MgÂ
= M ¡ ¿®M ¡ [1 ¡ ´Â(1 ¡ m)]Áe¿(1 ¡ ®)M.
Let now q(®) = ap(®) be the joint probability that an audit takes place,
a, and that evasion is veri…ed, p(®). Let ¦e be the expected income to the
taxpayer facing the evasion decision de…ned as
¦e ´ q¦b + (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ ¿®)M
= M ¡ ¿®M ¡ q [1¡ ´Â(1 ¡ m)]Áe¿(1¡ ®)M.
Clearly ¦e ¸ ¦b. Under the hypothesis of risk neutrality evasion takes place
if and only if ¦e is greater than the disposable income after paying the due
amount of the income tax
¦e ¡ (1 ¡ ¿)M > 0
that is, if and only if
Áep[1 ¡ ´Â(1 ¡ m)] < 1 (4)
The higher is the probability p(®) of verifying tax evasion and/or the lower
the joint probability Â(1 ¡ m) of a bribery agreement not being monitored,
the lower would be the …ne necessary to discourage underreporting of taxable
income. The assumption of a linear …ne for bribery implies that the …ne rate ÁÂ
does not have any role in exploiting the opportunity of evasion. Moreover, for
any p the expected income of the taxpayer in case of evasion ¦e is decreasing in
® provided that (4) holds, which implies the usual prediction that a risk-neutral
8taxpayer either reports the true taxable income (® = 1), or reports no income
at all (® = 0), depending on whether evasion has a positive expected payo¤.
We now follow Yitzhaki (1987) and introduce the assumption that the joint
probability of an audit taking place and the proof of evasion obtained is given
by q(®) = ap(®), with p® < 0 and p®;® ¸ 0. Moreover, given the auditing
technology it holds p(1) = 0 for any audited taxpayer and p(0) · 1.7 The
taxpayer’s problem is to determine ® in order to maximize the expected income,
given the deterrence policy and the opportunity of paying a bribe to the auditor
whether the evasion will be discovered:
Max
®
¦e(®) ´ ap(®)¦b + [1 ¡ ap(®)](1 ¡ ¿®)M]+ V(G):
Since the tax payer is measure zero with respect to the economy, she takes
as null the e¤ect of its contribution to the aggregate level of the public good.
Therefore, the …rst order condition of the expected utility maximization problem
implies a maximizing value b ®(Â;m;´;Áe;a) such that
aÁe [1 ¡ ´Â(1 ¡ m)][p(b ®) ¡ (1¡ b ®)pb ®]¡ 1 = 0 (5)
Further, the second order condition for a maximum requires that
2p® ¡ (1 ¡ ®)p®;® < 0
which is satis…ed by the assumptions on p(®).
Lemma 1 Given the assumptions on p(®), for any set of Â;m;´;Áe;a and
0 < ´ < 1, there exists 0 < b ® < 1.
Proof: see the appendix.
The intuition is straightforward. For ® low enough the assumptions on
p(®) guarantee large enough incentives to reduce evasion, the opposite being
true for ® close enough to 1. More generally, it is immediate to conclude that
@b ®=@Áe > 0, @b ®=@Â < 0, and @b ®=@m > 0, which will turn out to be crucial
results in the characterization of the overall equilibrium of the model8. A larger
…ne for evasion increases the direct cost of evasion and the indirect cost of
corruption both leading to an increase in b ®; a larger probability of corruption
decreases the expected cost of corruption leading to a decrease in b ®; …nally, the
intuition for b ® increasing in m is that a larger probability of monitoring bribing
coalitions increases the expected cost of corruption leading to an increase in b ®:
4 Endogenous corruption and monitoring
In this section, for a given b, we determine the probability of monitoring and
the level of corruption by modelling the relationship between auditors and the
7We implicitly assume that when any evidence of evasion is detected the auditor is able to
reveal the true taxable income of the taxpayer.
8As shown before, the …ne for bribing, ÁÂ, does not have any e¤ect on the decision of
evading.
9monitorers as an incomplete information inspection game. In the event that
an auditor manages to prove an act of evasion, which occurs with probability
ap(®), the opportunity of forming a bribing coalition emerges with probability Â
and the secret coalition is monitored with probability m. Both probabilities are
determined in such away that the public o¢cial is indi¤erent between taking the
bribe (not reporting the act of evasion) or not. The monitoring level is such that
the monitoring authority is indi¤erent between inspecting or not. As already
described in the introduction we consider two cases of the inspection game. In
the …rst case a prosecutor monitors so that if any auditor takes a bribe b, she
will collect a pecuniary …ne ÁÂb from both members of the monitored bribing
coalition.9 Alternatively, we consider the case where a Tax Authority’s inspects
at a level such that that if any auditor takes abribe b, she will collect a pecuniary
…ne for evasion ©e from the tax evader.
As for the tax auditor, her revenues are w whether she honestly reports
evasion or not. If discovered he always pays a …ne for corruption ©Â. Monitoring
activity entails a cost, z, which is private information to the tax authority.
In particular, we assume that from the perspective of the public o¢cial the
monitoring cost z is drawn from a uniform distribution on [0;z]. Figure 1
reports the payo¤ matrix for the game (for b > 0).
Figure 1 - The inspection game for a given b > 0
Prosecutor
Monitor (m) Not monitor (1¡ m)
Public Corrupt (Â) w ¡ ÁÂb;w + 2ÁÂb ¡ z w + b;w
O¢cial
Not corrupt (1 ¡ Â) w;w ¡ z w;w
We solve for the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the inspection game. If the
prosecutor monitors then its expected payo¤ will be equal to Â(w + 2ÁÂbp ¡
z)+(1¡Â)(w¡z), where Â is the probability of the public o¢cial not reporting
a detected evasion. Hence, for any given Â the tax authority’s best response
implies a cuto¤ rule: it monitors the public o¢cial if and only if z · 2ÁÂbÂp.
From the perspective of the public o¢cial, however, the tax authority monitors
with a given probability, m. Hence, in equilibrium m, is such that
2ÁÂbÂp = mz:
Looking at the decision of the public o¢cial, by inspection of the payo¤ matrix
it follows that she is indi¤erent between the two pure strategies, corrupt or not
corrupt, if and only if
¡ÁÂbm + b(1¡ m) = 0:
9Remember that when the bribe agreement is discovered the bribe agreement is undone.
Remember also that, to simplify, we are assuming that the same …ne rate to be applied both
to the public o¢cial and the taxpayer.










For any given b the probability of a corruptive coalition to occurr decreases
with the …ne rate ÁÂ. Moreover, in equilibrium, the proportion of public o¢cials
who take a bribe and do not report the detected evasion, Â, is inversely related
to the amount of the bribe. A higher bribe implies that any public o¢cial
expects a higher probability of monitoring by the public o¢cial which, in turn,
implies a lower probability of taking the bribe and not reporting the evasion.
By assuming proportional …nes it follows that, in equilibrium, m does not vary
with b.10
4.1 Monitoring by a Tax Authority
We now consider the case where the monitoring activity takes place within a
Tax Authority hierarchy. In this case, the incentive to monitoring for the Tax
Authority are provided by the collection of …nes for evasion, whereas the payo¤s
for the public o¢cials in charge of the tax auditing are the same as before. Thus,
the payo¤s matrix of the inspection game is given by:
Figure 2 - The inspection game for a given b > 0
Tax Authority
Monitor (m) Not monitor (1¡ m)
Public Corrupt (Â) w ¡ ÁÂb; w + ©e ¡ z w + b; w
O¢cial
Not corrupt (1 ¡ Â) w; w ¡ z w; w









It can be noticed that, with respect to the institutional setting examined in
the previous section, the monitoring probability is the same from the point of
view of the public o¢cial but the probability of corruption is inversely related
to the …ne for evasion and does not depend (neither directly, nor indirectly) on
the …ne for corruption.
10If ¹ z > 2(1+ÁÂ)ÁÂbp the monitoring game is solved for the corner solution ¹ = 1. In this
case the public o¢cial expects to be monitored with probability m = 2ÁÂbp=¹ z, which implies








> 0. Of course, the tax authority
monitors if and only if z · 2ÁÂbp.
115 Tax evasion and bribery agreement in equilib-
rium
Given a set (Áe, ÁÂ, ´, ¿, z, M), the auditing technology p(®) and Authority
budget constraint we solve for the equilibrium of the economy. Each taxpayer
decides the level of evasion, taking m and Â as given, (this determines b ®); each
public o¢cial decides whether to enter into a bribery agreement or not, given
m and b; at the same time, the prosecutor decides whether to monitor a given
public o¢cial, after having observed the monitoring cost z and given Â and
b. The level of b is determined as the Nash bargaining solution of the related
problem.
It is important to note that the taxpayer conceives his reporting strategy by
taking into account the e¤ect on p(®), but, being measure zero, she does not
take into account any e¤ect of her choice on the strategies to be chosen in the
continuation game, Â and m. p(®) is the probability of state (tax base) veri…ca-
tion, under the assumption that the larger the size of the evasion the easier is to
prove it. Technically, this amounts to solve for the optimal reporting strategy
simultaneously with the monitoring game between the monitoring agency and
the public o¢cials. The assumption of taxpayers being measure zero also has
the implication that, in determining the bribe b, no e¤ect on the value of m is
anticipated and taken into account. Therefore, Nash bargaining can be solved
independently of the monitoring game.
An interior equilibrium with bribe is a triple (®¤, m¤, Â¤) obtained as the
solution of (5), (6), and (7), given (3).
After substituting for m¤ from (6) into (5) and (7), the equilibrium level of








[p(®) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)p®] = 1 (8)
and
(1 + ÁÂ)ÁÂ(1¡ ´)Áe¿(1¡ ®)Mp(®)Â = z (9)
provided that Â¤ · 1.





aÁe [1¡ ´(1¡ m)][p(®) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)p®] = 1
ÁÂ(1¡ ´)Áe¿(1 ¡ ®)Mp(®) = mz
and Â¤ = 1.
By abusing language we refer to (9) as the auditor’s reaction function and
to (8) as the taxpayer’s reaction function.11
11Strictly speaking, the two equations do not properly de…ne the reaction functions for the
auditor and the taxpayer given that we substituted out the equilibrium value for m.
12Since p® < 0 and p®;® ¸ 0, the taxpayer’s reaction function, ®(Â), is
continuous and monotone decreasing in Â, while the auditor’s reaction func-
tion, Â(®), is continuous, convex, and monotone increasing in ®, with Â(0) =
z=
£
(1+ ÁÂ)ÁÂ(1 ¡ ´)Áe¿Mp(0)
¤
. The same qualitative features characterize
the system of equations for Â¤ = 1. Thus, we conclude that for any set of
parameters satisfying assumptions in Lemma 1, the equilibrium exists and it
involves both some evasion, ® < 1, and bribery, b > 0. In the following we
provide some comparative statics focusing on the case of Â < 1, which is of our
primary interest.
Figure 2 - Comparative statics
E¤ect on
Increase in Evasion Corrupted auditors Expected bribe
Fine for evasion, Áe ¡ ? =
Fine for bribing, ÁÂ ¡ ¡ ¡
Monitoring cost, z + + +
We study the e¤ects on the behavior of taxpayers and auditors of govern-
ment’s policy against bribery and tax evasion. First, consider the e¤ect of a
marginal increase in the …ne rate for tax evasion, Áe. By (8), for any given
amount of reported income, the rise of Áe both raises the extent of the penalty
for evasion and the amount of the bribe to be paid to the public o¢cial, if eva-
sion is detected. Thus, an increase of Áe raises the expected cost of evasion and
leads the taxpayer to report a larger share of her income. At the same time, for
any given Â and ®, the larger bribe that the taxpayer would be willing to pay
would induce the auditor to expect a higher probability of monitoring by the
prosecutor. Therefore, from the auditor’s perspective, the higher …ne Áe would
reduce the incentive to take a bribe, reinforcing the previous e¤ect on ®¤: after
a small increase in the …ne for evasion, the equilibrium share of reported taxable
income, ®¤, will de…nitely be higher.
The e¤ect of the increased …ne for evasion on b¤ and Â¤ is ambiguous. In
particular, looking at the equilibrium level of the bribe
b







it follows that by raising Áe the bribe will rise when the positive direct e¤ect
of Áe on b¤ is stronger than the negative indirect e¤ect which operates through
1 ¡ ®¤, that is the bribe increases if and only if




A fall in Â¤ is consistent with a rise in b¤ while a rise in Â¤ is consistent with
any variation in b¤; in any case the ex-ante expected amount of bribery, Âbp,
does not vary.
Consider next the e¤ect of a marginal increase in the …ne rate for bribery,
ÁÂ. As shown before a change in ÁÂ determines direct e¤ects neither on the
13amount of the penalty for evasion nor on the expected cost of exploiting the
opportunity of bribery, the latter being (1¡ ´ + ´m)Áe¿(1 ¡ ®)M. The rise in
the penalty rate ÁÂ, however, determines a reduction in the value of m¤ which
implies, for any given Â, that the taxpayer’s incentive to evade will be reduced.
For the auditor, a larger ÁÂ increases the expected cost of taking a bribe, for any
given b, reducing her incentive to be corrupted.12 It can be shown that after a
rise in the penalty rate for bribery the new equilibrium will be characterised by
a lower level of corruption, Â¤, as well as a lower level of evasion, that is higher
®¤ (see appendix).13 Both the equilibrium level of b¤ and the expected amount
of bribery, Âbp, will be de…nitively reduced.14
Finally, consider a change in government’s policy when the corruption rate
is Â¤ = 1, that is all detected evasion are not reported to the prosecutor. A
small increase in Áe reduces the extent of evasion.
The results above may be summarized in the following
Proposition 2 If bribery is pro…table b¤ > 0, a tougher deterrence policy, in
the form of increased …nes, will always be e¤ective for reducing evasion. On the
other hand the e¤ect on corruption is ambiguous if a tougher policy is imple-
mented through the level of …ne for evasion.
We now brie‡y present the comparative statics results of the model in the
case where the monitoring activity of public o¢cials is delegated to the Tax
Authority.
The e¤ect of an increase of the …ne for evasion on both the level of evasion and
the level of corruption is qualitatively the same as in the framework described
above. On the contrary, in the present case, an increase in the …ne for corruption
can determine an increase in the level of evasion for relatively low levels of the
…ne for corruption.
The intuition for this result is the following: an increase in the …ne for
corruption reduces the monitoring probability of an amount which is the same
in the two institutional arrangements. Thus, the negative e¤ect on ®, through
m is the same. However, in both cases, an increase of the …ne for corruption
a¤ects ® also through the probability of corruption Â. While, in the previous
framework, the positive e¤ect on ® was always stronger than the negative one,
thus leading to an unambiguous prediction, in the present case the overall e¤ect
12Given m, a larger ÁÂ reduces the incentiveof the public o¢cial to take a bribe, due to the
larger expected cost of bribery, that is reduces Â. The net e¤ect of larger ÁÂ and alower Â will
induce, however, the auditor to expect that the tax authority will monitor more, determining
a further reduction in Â.
13From the perspective of the auditor, the monitoring probability of the tax authority, m¤,
will be reduced.
14Note that even if the qualitative e¤ect of a rise in either Áe or ÁÂ on Â can be similar,
the mechanics are completely di¤erent. In the case of a rise in Áe the direct e¤ect as well as
the equilibrium e¤ect on Â operate, coeteris paribus, mainly through a change in the bribe,
that is the revenue of bribery. In particular, if in equilibrium the bribe will reduce the level
of Â will increase. On the contrary, in the case of a rise in ÁÂ the bribe does not change in
a direct way. Thus, the e¤ect of an increase in ÁÂ operates, in a …rst instance, through the
cost of bribing.
14on tax evasion depends on the size of the …ne for corruption: if this is greater
(smaller) than one, tax evasion will be reduced (increased). The reason for
this result is to be found in the particular structure of the payo¤ matrix in the
present setting: namely, the …ne rate for corruption does not in‡uence the size
of the revenue form the monitoring activity.
Finally, let us consider brie‡y the case when the monitoring cost z is common
knowledge (a case of interest for the following welfare analysis). The main result
is that an increase in the …ne for corruption (in both the institutional settings
discussed above) determines an increase in the level of evasion.
6 Welfare Analysis (Preliminary)
In this section we use the results derived above to assess the normative impli-
cations of our model of tax evasion, corruption and monitoring. Let us brie‡y
summarize the …ndings obtained so far. We study an economy composed of a
population of measure 1 = n0 + n1 + n2. A fraction n0 of it produces income
M pays ¿®M as an income tax taking the gamble to evade part of it. Tax
revenues are collected to …nance the public good to be provided in the economy.
A fraction n1 is paid a …xed wage w, is assigned the right to audit tax payers
and is endowed with a state veri…cation technology that allows the tax audi-
tors to verify the true tax base with a probability p(®). In the event evasion is
proved the opportunity of corruption emerges at an equilibrium probability Â.
A fraction of (uncorruptible) n2 = n1m agents is assigned the right to monitor
the tax auditors.
In order to provide normative results we need to specify the institutional
setting of the monitoring game, the budget constraints of the monitoring au-
thority and the …scal budget in the aggregate. Before doing that, however, it
is worth discussing the issue of the remuneration of the law enforcers. Having
assumed no commitment to the probability of detection of corruption on the
part of the planner we let the planner to choose the number of tax auditors n1
but not the number of agents monitoring corruption. The number of agents in
charge for the enforcement of anti-corruption legislation is set in equilibrium by
the model as in the previous section. The remuneration to all enforcers is set at
the expected income in the economy:
w ´ Ey = (1 ¡ ®¿)M ¡ ap[(1 ¡ Â + Âm)©e + bÂ(1¡ m) + Â©Âm] (10)
Intuitively, expected income is given by net income (gross of evasion) less
expected …nes. Notice that, by this assumption, all the agents in our economy
are ex-ante indi¤erent across jobs and get utility
U(:) = Ey + V(G) (11)
satisfying the envelope condition U®(:) =
dEy
d® = 0.
15After substituting the equilibrium condition of the inspection game and the
equilibrium value of the bribe and assuming ´ = 1=2 we obtain the following
expression for the expected income
Ey = (1¡ ®¿)M ¡ ap[1¡
Â
2
(1 ¡ m)]©e (12)
We can de…ne now the budget for the Tax Authority as follows
B + ©eÂmpn1 = w(1 + m)n1 + zmn1 (13)
Where B is the transfers from the …scal budget, ©eÂmpn1 is the total rev-
enues from collected …nes for evasion as in the second inspection game described
in the previous section, w(1+m)n1 is the total (net) wage paid to law enforcers,
zmn1 is the total amount of direct costs of monitoring. From equilibrium condi-
tions in the inspection game we get B = w(1+m)n1. The general …scal budget
is then given by
G + B = n0¿®M + n1p(1 ¡ Â + Âm)©e + 2n1pÂ©Âm (14)
Where G is the value of the public good provided in the economy, n0¿®M
is the volontary component of tax revenues, n1p(1 ¡ Â)©e is the total value of
the enforced …ne for evasion not accruing to the budget of the Tax Authority
(voluntary payment of the …nes by tax payers not joining a bribing coalition)
and, …nally, 2n1pÂ©Âm is the value of the …nes for corruption obtained as an
indirect revenue for the monitoring activity, which we assume to be accrued to
the provision of the public good. After substituting the equilibrium conditions
from the inspection game we get a reduced form for the amount of public good
provided in the economy
G = [1 ¡ n1(1 + m)]M ¡ Ey ¡ n1zm (15)
The planner is modelled as an utilitarian legislator whose problem is to
maximize total welfare (remember that the total population is normalized to 1)
U(:) = Ey + u(G) (16)
with respect to the tax rate ¿ (implicitly de…ning G), the …ne rates, Áe, ÁÂ
and the number of auditors n1, subject to (??) and to the limited …scal liability
constraint
©e + ©Â · (1 ¡ ®¿)M (17)




s.to G = [1¡ n1(1+ m)]M ¡ Ey ¡ n1zm
©e + ©Â · (1¡ ®¿)M
U® = 0
(18)
16the solution for this program can be characterized by standard techniques.
By substitituting equilibrium values for ©e and ©Â for the case of symmet-
ric bargaining power in the bribing coalition, we can write the Lagrangean as
follows. (See Appendix).




By solving the Lagrangean we obtain the following
Proposition 3 At an interior equilibrium (®¤;m¤;Â¤) i. maximal …nes prin-
ciple holds in (18) and G = G¤ ii. Áe > 0, ÁÂ > 0.
Proof. Set ¸ = 0 in 18 and get a contradiction. See Appendix for details.
The intuition is rather simple. Part i. can be explained as follows. Assume
maximal …ne does not hold. Since d®=dÁe > 0 there must be overdeterrence.
The planner can increase G up to its …rst best level G¤. Furthermore in order
to save costs the planner is willing to cut on monitoring costs by reducing n1
and increasing the number of tax payers producing M at the cost of diluting
deterrence, the reported ® by each tax payer decreases. This argument holds
true at any given level of G¤, leading to a corner solution in n1 = 0 and ® = 0.
The intuition for part ii. is an immediate implication of the equilibrium being
interior. The reason is that both …nes are useful to deter the underlying of-
fence (tax evasion): raising the …ne for evasion makes a bribing more costly and
increases deterrence on the underlying o¤ence and would tend to increase mon-
itoring activities and costs (…nes for evasion can be increased only by increasing
monitoring costs, which in equilibrium of the inspection game will be paid in
terms of larger corruption). To save on costs of enforcement the only instru-
ment to the planner is to increase the …ne for corruption. Jointly considered
the design of the two …nes saturates the …scal liability constraint of the o¤ender
(maximal …nes). Notice that, di¤erently from the classical analysis of optimal
deterrence, increasing …nes in our model tend to raise the cost of enforcement.
For future reference de…ne ~ Áe and ~ ÁÂ as the maximal possible …nes at the
optimum. Before characterizing the optimal trade o¤ between the …ne for eva-
sion and the …ne for corruption another result is worth noticing. Let us denote
~ G as the amount of public good to be provided in the economy at the optimum
as de…ned by (??) where ~ ¿ (the tax rate at the optimum), ~ Áe and ~ ÁÂ are used
to compute Ey. The following result can be shown to hold
Proposition 4 In an economy with imperfect commitment to monitoring and
maximal …nes a utilitarian planner will choose ~ ¿ such that ~ G < G¤:
Proof. See appendix
The reason is the following: at maximal …ne the tax rate that implements
G = G¤ is ~ ¿ > ¿¤ (since the costs of the enforcement structure have to be
…nanced) and underdeterrence holds. Notice also that in our model large ¿
induces some deterrence since, by increasing bribes, gives larger incentives to
monitor. On the other hand total punishment is limited by the tax rate. At
17G = G¤ the …ne for evasion is a more e¢cient instrument to deter evasion
therefore the planner is willing to reduce ¿ and increase Áe.
In other words, in our model, the planner would like to raise ¿ in order to
increase the level of monitoring. At the equilibrium cum evasion, however, the
increased incentives to monitor are settled by reducing evasion and decreasing
corruption. The limited …scal liability is thus reduced.
Notice also that since the general budget has to …nance wages to monitorer,
~ G < G¤ does not necessarily imply that ~ ¿ < ¿ ¤. The actual tax rate in an
economy with imperfect enforcement may well be above the optimal level of
taxation obtained in the case of honest taxpayers (…rst best).
7 Conclusions
We considered a simple economy where self interested tax payers may have
incentives to evade taxes and, to escape sanctions, to bribing public o¢cials in
charge for collections. Di¤erently from the classical theory of law enforcement
we let the legislator not be committed to a given level of detecting corruption
and we analyzed the interactions between evasion, corruption and monitoring as
well as their adjustment to a change in the institutional setting. In the proposed
framework, larger …nes induce two e¤ects. On the one hand, an increase in the
size of the …ne induces a stronger deterrence; on the other hand, however, it
determines a larger incentive to corrupt, by increasing the di¤erence between
the disposable income if evasion is detected and the disposable income if it is
not. Furthermore, we …nd that, in equilibrium, an increase in the …nes reduces
tax evasion whereas the e¤ect on corruption can be ambiguous.
We also considered the optimal design of …nes in a normative perspective.
Interestingly enough a maximal …ne principle holds in the case of a utilitarian
legislator, despite the fact that raising …nes increases monitoring activities and
their cost to society. The reason for this result is that, in an environment with
imperfect enforcement, the amount of public good provided by a utilitarian
government is smaller than its level at …rst best: underdeterrence hold at the
constrained optimal tax rate. This leads to maximal …ne.
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198 Appendix A
To determine the behaviour of the endogenous variables at the optimum after
a local variation in the parameter of interest, let denote





[p(®¤) ¡ (1 ¡ ®¤)p®¤]¡ 1,
F















































evaluated at the optimum is strictly negative. Hence, the sign of the derivative








































evaluated at the optimum. The determinant is always strictly positive. More-
over, the sign of the derivative of Â¤ with respect to Áe is the same as the sign














































A su¢cient condition for
@Â
@Áe > 0 is







In this section we provide the derivation of the main results on the normative
analysis.
















By taking account of the constraints c.3, c.4 and c.5 (holding as strict equal-
ities at an interior equilibrium) into the de…nition of Ey, de…ne the lagrangian
for the Kuhn Tucker problem as
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@n1 [1 ¡ u
0(G)] ¡ u
0(G)[(1+ m)M + mz)
+¸[Áe(1+
ÁÂ
4 ) ¡ 1]¿ d®
dn1
n1¸ 0
By studying di¤erent cases we prove now the proposition in the text.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Assume ¸ = 0, Áe > 0, ÁÂ > 0, n1 > 0,. From L¿ = 0 we get u0(G) ¡ 1 = 0,
i.e. if the …scal liability constraint is not binding, there is nounderdeterrence and
¿ is set to obtain the …rst best level of G. From LÁÂ get ¡[(M + z)n1
dm
dÁÂ] > 0
from the comparative statics results holding for dm
dÁÂ < 0. Therefore we get
a contradiction: at …rst best the planner would like to increase the …ne for
corruption to saturate the …scal liability constraint. Moreover from Ln1 we get:
¡[(1 + m)M + mz) < 0, that is provided that underdeterrence holds at …rst
best the planner is willing to save on monitoring cost by redicing the number
of auditors contradicting the hypothesis that the equilibrium is at interior ®, m
and Â.¤
21Proof of Proposition 4 (Preliminary).
Assume ¸ > 0, Áe > 0, ÁÂ > 0, n1 > 0 and G = G¤ and use the following
L¸ = 1¡ ®¿ ¡ Áe(1 +
ÁÂ
4 )(1¡ ®)¿ = 0 ¸ ¸ 0
L¿ = [Áe(1+
ÁÂ
4 ) ¡ 1](® + ¿ d®
d¿ ) ¡ Áe(1 +
ÁÂ
4 ) = 0 ¿ ¸ 0
LÁe = [Áe(1 +
ÁÂ
4 ) ¡ 1]¿
d®
dÁe ¡ (1 +
ÁÂ
4 )(1 ¡ ®)¿ = 0 Áe ¸ 0
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Intuitively, these two conditions require that at G = G¤ the deterrence
e¤ect of both ® and Áe is the same. By substituting d®=d¿ and d®=dÁe from
the comparative statics for the interior equilibrium we get that the requirement
is not veri…ed, yielding a contradiction. Intuitively Fines are more e¢cient in
deterrence compared to ¿. The planner is willing to reduce ¿ and increase Áe.
(To be completed). ¤
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